Underwater wireless communication networks (UWCNs) include
sensors and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) that interact to perform
specific applications such as underwater monitoring. Coordination and
information sharing between sensors and AUVs make the provision of security
challenging.
The unique characteristics of the underwater acoustic channel and the differences between such networks and their ground based counterparts require the development of efficient and reliable security mechanisms.
The unique characteristics of the underwater acoustic channel and the differences between such networks and their ground based counterparts require the development of efficient and reliable security mechanisms.
The aquatic environment is particularly vulnerable to
malicious attacks due to the high bit error rates, large and variable
propagation delay, low bandwidth of acoustic channels in water. Achieving
reliable inter vehicle and sensor-AUV communication is especially difficult due
to the mobility of AUVs and the movement of sensors with water currents.
The above mentioned characteristics of UWCNs have several
security issues associated like packet errors, eavesdropping, modification of
packets, and many more. Also since power consumption in underwater
communications is higher than in terrestrial radio communications energy
exhaustion attacks can reduce network life.
The different attacks possible are Jamming, Wormholes,
Selective Forwarding, Sybil Attacks, etc. Defences for these are discussed.
Jamming can be overcome by Spread Spectrum techniques, Wormhole detection is
done with a visual modelling using Dis-VoW and other attacks can be countered
by authentication, verification, and positioning.
Open research challenges for secure localization, routing
and time synchronization are mentioned. In this paper UWCNs is discussed, with emphasis on the
possible attacks, countermeasures and further opportunities and scope for
development in this direction to improve security of such networks.
Overview of Underwater Wireless
Communication Networks
Underwater wireless communication networks (UWCNs) consist
of sensors and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) that interact, coordinate
and share information with each other to carry out sensing and monitoring
functions. A pictorial representation is shown below:
In last several years, underwater communication network
(UWCN) has found an increasing use in a widespread range of applications, such
as coastal surveillance systems, environmental research, autonomous underwater
vehicle (AUV) operation, oil-rig maintenance, collection of data for water
monitoring, linking submarines to land, to name a few.
By deploying a distributed and scalable sensor network in a
3-dimensional underwater space, each underwater sensor can monitor and detect
environmental parameters and events locally. Hence, compared with remote
sensing, UWCNs provide a better sensing and surveillance technology to acquire
better data to understand the spatial and temporal complexities of underwater environments.
Present underwater communication systems involve the transmission of
information in the form of sound, electromagnetic (EM), or optical waves. Each
of these techniques has advantages and limitations.
Based on applications there are three types of UWSNs (sensor
networks):
1) Mobile UWSNs for long-term non-time critical applications
(M-LT-UWSNs);
2) Static UWSNs for long-term non-time critical applications
(S-LT-UWSNs);
3) Mobile UWSNs for short-term time-critical applications
(M-ST-UWSNs).
Besides the UWSNs mentioned above, underwater networks also
include sparse mobile AUV (autonomous underwater vehicle) or UUV (unmanned
underwater vehicle) networks, where vehicles/nodes can be spaced out by several
kilometres. These types of networks have their unique communication
requirements.
Among the three types of waves, acoustic waves are used as
the primary carrier for underwater wireless communication systems due to the
relatively low absorption in underwater environments.
The security requirements to be met in UWCNs are:
• Authentication: Authentication
is the proof that the data received was sent by a legitimate sender. This is
essential in military and safety-critical applications of UWCNs.
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality
means that information is not accessible to unauthorized third parties. It
needs to be guaranteed in critical applications such as maritime surveillance.
• Integrity: It
ensures that information has not been altered by any adversary. Many underwater
sensor applications for environmental preservation, such as water quality
monitoring, rely on the integrity of information.
Availability: The data should be available when needed by an authorized
user. Lack of availability due to denial-of-service attacks would especially
affect time-critical aquatic exploration applications such as prediction of
seaquakes.
Some common terminology used here is defined:
• Attack: Attempt
to gain unauthorized access to a service, resource, or information, or the
attempt to compromise integrity, availability, or confidentiality.
• Attacker, Intruder,
Adversary : The originator of an attack.
• Vulnerability : Weakness
in system security design, implementation, or limitations that could be
exploited.
• Threat : Any circumstance or event (such as the existence of an
attacker and vulnerabilities) with the potential to adversely impact a system
through a security breach.
Defence : An idea or system or model that counters an attack
Jamming and Spread Spectrum Technique to Counter Jamming:
Jamming is deliberate interference with radio reception to
deny the target's use of a communication channel. For single-frequency
networks, it is simple and effective, rendering the jammed node unable to
communicate or coordinate with others in the network.
A jamming attack consists of interfering with the physical
channel by putting up carriers on the frequencies used by nodes to communicate.
Since it requires a lot of energy, attackers usually attack in sporadic bursts.
Since underwater acoustic frequency bands are narrow (from a few to hundreds of
kilohertz), UWCNs are vulnerable to narrowband jamming. Localization is
affected by the replay attack when the attacker jams the communication between
a sender and a receiver, and later replays the same message with stale
information (an incorrect reference) posing as the sender.In frequency hopping,
a device transmits a signal on a frequency for a short period of time, changes
to a different frequency and repeats. The transmitter and receiver must be
coordinated. Direct-sequence spreads the signal over a wide band, using a
pseudo-random bit stream. A receiver must know the spreading code to
distinguish the signal from noise.
Frequency-hopping schemes are somewhat resistant to
interference from an attacker who does not know the hopping sequence. However, the
attacker may be able to jam a wide band of the spectrum, or even follow the
hopping sequence by scanning for the next transmission and quickly tuning the
transmitter.
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